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INTRODUCTION
Enforcement of insider-trading regulations is currently a high priority for
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). This is unsurprising, as the
SEC tends to enforce insider-trading laws more vigorously when markets are
volatile.' But where should the SEC focus its investigations? This Comment ar-
gues that the SEC should concentrate on enforcing insider-trading regulations
most vigorously against individuals who are not employees or directors of the
corporation whose shares are being traded. In contrast, the SEC should regard
as a lower priority the enforcement of insider-trading regulations against that
corporation's employees and directors. Companies are capable of taking various
forms of action against their own employees and directors who trade in their
own stock.' But more importantly, as this Comment will show, the companies
also have the power to permit insiders to trade on inside information in their
own stock.
Part I identifies the regulatory and normative underpinnings of insid-
er-trading regulation and describes how the regulations are perceived as a man-
datory prohibition.3 Part II challenges this view and argues that a corporation
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1. See, e.g., Guilty as Charged: The Verdict Is Finally In, ECONOMIST, May 12, 20n, at
90; SEC Enforcement Actions: Insider Trading Cases, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COM-
MISSION (Oct. 6, 2011), http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/insidertrading/cases.shtml
("Insider trading continues to be a high priority area for the SEC's enforcement
program.").
2. For example, a company is perfectly able to forbid its employees, as a contractual
matter, from trading in its stock. It may also use the federal securities laws to seek
damages from employees who trade on inside information. See sources cited infra
note 8.
3. In this Comment, I use the phrase "insider-trading regulation" to refer to federal
regulation. But insider trading can also be the subject of derivative suits for breach
of the duty of loyalty under state law. See, e.g., Pfeiffer v. Toll, 989 A.2d 683 (Del.
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may permit its employees to carry out the equivalent of insider trading on the
corporation's own stock. Part III discusses the implications of this argument for
the SEC's enforcement of insider-trading regulations.
I. REGULATORY AND NORMATIVE UNDERPINNINGS OF INSIDER TRADING
The literature on insider trading is vast, and I will review it only very brief-
ly. The most important prohibition on insider trading is SEC Rule lob-5. 4 Un-
der what is known as the "classical theory,"' this rule is used to prohibit trading
on material, nonpublic information by an individual who owes a fiduciary duty
to the corporation whose stock is being traded. The rule can also be used to
prohibit trading by an individual who "misappropriates" inside information in
breach of a duty owed to the source of the information-whether or not that
individual is a corporate insider.' These rules are all-encompassing and, on
their face, mandatory: The SEC can pursue any person who violates them and
seek civil or criminal penalties.7 There is also a private right of action for per-
sons harmed by insider trading.'
Some scholars have argued that insider-trading prohibitions should not be
mandatory, and that shareholders should be able to choose whether to permit
Ch. 2010) (discussing the duty of loyalty under Delaware law), abrogated on other
grounds by Kahn v. Kolberg Kravis Roberts & Co., 23 A.3d 831 (Del. 2011) (reaf-
firming the duty of loyalty but modifying the precise standard).
4. 17 C.F.R. § 240.1ob-5 (2012). There are two other insider-trading regulations. Sec-
tion 16(b) of the 1934 Securities and Exchange Act prevents "short-swing" insider
trading by officers, directors, and those holding a stake greater than ten percent in
the company. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (2006 & Supp. 2011). SEC Rule 14e-3 prohibits in-
sider trading during tender offers. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3 (2012).
5. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 229 (1980) (describing the classical
theory, although not terming it as such). The phrase "classical theory" was used in
United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 652 (1997). Employees of a corporation
owe a fiduciary duty to that corporation; third parties not employed full-time by a
corporation, such as attorneys and consultants, can also "temporarily" owe a fi-
duciary duty to a corporation. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 655 n.14 (1983).
6. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 652.
7. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-1 (2oo6 & Supp. 2011) (civil penalties); id. § 78ff(a) (2006) (crimi-
nal penalties).
8. An implied private right of action under Section lo(b) of the Securities and Ex-
change Act was first found by a court in Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F.
Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946). It has been reaffirmed repeatedly since. See, e.g., Ston-
eridge Inv. Partners v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 152 (2008). A private
right of action is also available for violations of Rule 14e-3. See, e.g., O'Connor &
Assocs. v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 529 F. Supp. 1179 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). There is
an explicit private right of action under Section 16(b) of the Securities and Ex-
change Act of 1934- 15 U.S.C. § 78p (2006 & Supp. 2011).
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individuals to trade inside on their companies' stock.9 These arguments have
typically relied on the effect of insider trading on promoting efficient markets
and its effectiveness as a compensation scheme.'o Others have rebutted these ar-
guments and contended that such trading should be banned." But regardless of
the merits of insider trading in general, there is no question that the federal reg-
ulations against it are seen as prohibitions. 2 And enforcement of these prohibi-
tions is not limited to the SEC and private individuals. Indeed, public stock ex-
changes are also required to promote compliance with insider-trading laws.
However, as the next Part shows, there are reasons to treat the body of law
regulating insider trading as less of a general prohibition than it appears. Cor-
porations are able to take advantage of state laws governing fiduciary duty to
compensate their employees in ways that have effects that are similar to insider
trading. This invites the possibility that, to some extent, a corporation may
"permit" insider trading in its stock by its own employees.
II. PERMITTING "INSIDER TRADING" THROUGH COMPENSATION SCHEMES
The Delaware courts have discussed two ways in which companies may
mimic the effect of insider trading in their own stock.14 First, a company may
grant "springloaded" options as part of compensation. Awarding stock options
as part of a compensation package is standard practice in corporations. Howev-
er, as Chancellor Chandler pointed out in In re Tyson Foods, Inc., granting
springloaded options is different: "A compensation committee that 'spring
loads' options grants them to executives before the release of material infor-
mation reasonably expected to drive the shares of such options higher."5 In Ty-
son Foods, the compensation committee granted options to executives at suspi-
ciously well-timed moments-for example, a few days before the company
released results that it knew would exceed analysts' expectations. 6 The plaintiffs
9. See, e.g., Dennis W. Carlton & Daniel R. Fischel, The Regulation of Insider Trading,
35 STAN. L. REV. 857, 894 (1983).
10. The classic expression of this view is found in HENRY G. MANNE, INSIDER TRAD-
ING AND THE STOCK MARKET (1966).
i. One argument that counsels toward prohibiting insider trading is that it is simply
unfair. See, e.g., In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 912 (1961) (discussing the
"inherent unfairness" of insider trading).
12. See, e.g., David D. Haddock & Jonathan R. Macey, A Coasian Model of Insider
Trading, 80 Nw. U. L. REV. 1449, 1451 (1986) (noting "the SEC's refusal to permit
firms to opt out of its rules").
13. WILLIAM K.S. WANG & MARC I. STEINBERG, INSIDER TRADING 613-14 (3d ed.
2010).
14. I focus on Delaware because of the state's dominance in the field of corporate law.
15. In re Tyson Foods, Inc., 919 A.2d 563, 576 n.16 (Del. Ch. 2007).
16. Id. at 576.
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alleged that the board of directors violated its fiduciary duty by approving these
options: The board's actions were deceptive, they claimed, because the compa-
ny maintained in public that the springloaded options had been granted at
market rates.'7
Chancellor Chandler agreed: "Granting spring-loaded options, without ex-
plicit authorization from shareholders, clearly involves an indirect deception."i"
Such action violated the duty of loyalty toward shareholders. However, the
phrase "without explicit authorization" is crucial: As the Chancellor went on to
say, springloading could be legal if the options were issued without circumvent-
ing "otherwise valid shareholder-approved restrictions."19
In Desimone v. Barrows, then-Vice Chancellor Strine considered again the
circumstances under which springloading would constitute a breach of fiduci-
ary duty.2 o Desimone was a derivative suit involving allegations that the directors
of a company had received springloaded options in breach of their duties to its
shareholders. The Vice Chancellor noted that if the directors fully disclosed
their motivations for receiving springloaded options, there would be no breach
of fiduciary duty from the act of receiving the options itself."
Although springloading is not necessarily a form of insider trading, as
Chancellor Chandler suggested in Tyson Foods, it can accomplish similar re-
sults." An individual who engages in insider trading attempts to profit by buy-
ing shares that, based on inside information, he thinks will appreciate in value,
or by selling shares that the information suggests will depreciate. A company
employee who receives springloaded options may exercise the options when the
share price has risen, and thus replicate the economic effect of buying shares
that are expected to appreciate.
Springloading is related to another practice: "bullet-dodging."2 4 When a
corporation grants bullet-dodging options, it deliberately releases bad news be-
fore the options are issued. Vice Chancellor Strine noted the business logic of
this practice in Desimone, where he observed that a failure to release bad news
before the granting of the options could leave the recipient with "underwater"
17. Id. at 590.
18. Id. at 592.
19. Id. at 593.
20. 924 A.2d 908, 937-38 (Del. Ch. 2007).
21. Id. at 937 n.98. The Vice Chancellor noted that there might be an unrelated action
for breach of fiduciary duty by receiving excessive compensation. Id.
22. In re Tyson Foods, 919 A.2d 563, 593 (Del. Ch. 2007).
23. The recipient of the options may not replicate the entire effect of insider trading:
He will not own the stock, and therefore he cannot exercise voting rights.
24. See Desimone, 924 A.2d at 943.
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options. 5 Like springloading, bullet-dodging can be analogized to insider trad-
ing. Although it does not replicate the effect of trading on stock that is expected
to appreciate, bullet-dodging does imitate the effect of successfully timing the
market. The person who receives bullet-dodging options whose value is linked
to the issuing corporation's stock price at the time of granting is in a similar sit-
uation to the person who buys shares when the market is in a trough, rather
than at a peak.
If a corporation's shareholders specifically empower the compensation
committee to grant springloaded or bullet-dodging options to employees, these
individuals would profit from the "inside" information, but the corporation
would be in no breach of fiduciary duty under Tyson Foods and Desimone. Nor
would the behavior be illegal under federal securities laws. The approval of the
corporation's shareholders would shield the compensation committee and the
recipient of the options from charges of breaches of fiduciary duty or misap-
propriation of confidential information, and would provide a defense to charg-
es of breaching Rule lob-5-
The practice of granting stock options typically is limited to company exec-
utives. But there is, in theory, no reason why it could not be extended to em-
ployees in general. Shareholders could vote to permit a corporation to grant
springloaded or bullet-dodging options to all employees. Such a scheme would
be very unusual, but it is theoretically achievable. For example, the corporation
could stipulate, by contract, that employees would not be permitted to trade the
stock of the corporation, but that if they were to have any successes deemed
likely to lead to a rise in the share price of the company, they could apply to the
compensation committee to be granted springloaded options as a reward." (A
corporation could not, on the other hand, institute a general scheme involving
bullet-dodging: It would be bizarre, to say the least, for a compensation com-
mittee to reward employees with bullet-dodging options in anticipation of a fall
in the share price.)
Because corporate directors, officers, and employees may legally mimic the
effect of insider trading, the federal prohibition on insider trading may be less
mandatory than conventionally thought. For its part, the SEC appears to accept
the possibility of springloading: It has adopted regulations that require a corpo-
ration to explain any springloading to its shareholders." The existence of
25. Id. at 944-45. "Underwater" options are options whose exercise price is higher
than the current price of the stock; in other words, the owner of the options has
no incentive to exercise them.
26. See supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text.
27. For example, if a mining company wishes to reward geologists who discovered a
particularly rich vein of ore, it could grant them options before the news of the
discovery reached the market. This was the scheme in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur
Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968).
28. See 17 C.F.R. § 229-402(b) (2012).
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springloading and bullet-dodging has implications for the regulation of insider
trading.
III. PRIORITIZING ENFORCEMENT OF INSIDER TRADING
A. Conceptualizing Insider Trading as a Default Rule
Because a corporation may legally permit its employees to use inside in-
formation for financial advantage, the SEC's prohibition on insider trading
should be seen not as a "mandatory" rule but rather as a "default" rule. Manda-
tory rules are, as the term implies, categorical commands that cannot be waived
by the parties concerned. Default rules, on the other hand, are rules that can be
contracted around by the parties."
The default rule against insider trading by employees is very "sticky," or
difficult to contract around,3 o since it is hard for a compensation committee to
receive shareholder approval to award springloaded or bullet-dodging options.
This sticky default rule prohibiting insider trading can thus alternatively be
viewed as a default with an "altering rule" that is very difficult to use. An alter-
ing rule is a rule that permits a party to toggle from the default setting to the al-
ternative setting. The altering rule that governs insider-trading regulations can
be termed an "impeding" altering rule in that it strongly encourages parties to
stick to the default.
Of course, it is true that if a corporation chooses to use the altering rule and
grant springloaded or bullet-dodging options, it does not implement a scheme
that has all the ill effects of insider trading. The effect of springloaded or bul-
let-dodging options is to transfer the company's resources from shareholders in
general to employees. Insider trading in its simplest form-the buying or selling
of shares in the open market-affects certain shareholders (i.e., those who are
unfortunate enough to be on the other side of the bargain) while leaving others
unaffected (i.e., those who do not buy or sell).3' Because this kind of insider
trading places all of the burden on some shareholders while leaving others un-
touched, it seems more unfair than grants of springloaded or bullet-dodging
options, where the burden is borne by all shareholders.
Nevertheless, the legality of springloading and bullet-dodging militates in
favor of treating insider trading as a default rule. Giving springloaded options
29. For the seminal exposition of the uses of default rules as opposed to mandatory
rules, see Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An
Economic Theory ofDefault Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87 (1989).
30. See Ian Ayres, Regulating Opt-Out: An Economic Theory of Altering Rules, 121 YALE
L.J. 2032 (2012). The following discussion of altering rules relies on this work.
31. Indeed, shareholders who are not counterparties to a trade made on the basis of
inside information may in fact benefit from the trade, as the trade has revealed in-
formation to the market and thus may make the corporation's share price more
accurate. See supra note io and accompanying text.
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without shareholder approval is undoubtedly insider trading, as the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit noted in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.3 ' And
while the granting of springloaded options is different from the simplest form
of insider trading (i.e., buying or selling stock in the market) in that the former
potentially has a broader base of victims, this difference is one of degree and not
kind33 : Both involve the transfer of company resources to those who possess
material, nonpublic information. With this in mind, I turn now to the question
of whether viewing the prohibition on insider trading as a default rule, rather
than a mandatory rule, should affect how the SEC attempts to enforce it.
B. SEC Enforcement of Insider Trading
The argument that the SEC should see "outsider" trading as more im-
portant than insider trading rests on two principles: (i) the prohibition on in-
sider trading can be considered a default rule, and (2) there is a private right of
action for insider trading.
Conceptualizing insider trading as a default rule means that insider trading
is susceptible to private contracting. (Recall that a default rule, as opposed to a
mandatory rule, is a rule that can be contracted around.34 ) From here, we can
conceive of insider-trading regulations as constituting a contract between
shareholders and the corporation, just like other aspects of the corporate form."
The existence of a private right of action for failure to abide by these regulations
reinforces the notion that insider-trading regulations constitute a private con-
tract. Private contracts are, of course, enforceable only through the private
rights of action that one party has if the other party is in breach, and the ability
of shareholders to choose whether to sue to enforce the insider-trading regula-
tions makes these regulations akin to private contracts.
The resemblances between private contracts and the insider-trading regula-
tions that affect corporate employees do not mean that the SEC should never be
involved in enforcing the regulations. It is not unusual for securities regulations
to consist of what are effectively "default rules" and "altering rules," combined
32. 401 F.2d at 856-57.
33. In the long run, this difference may even out. Insiders usually make transactions
on only a very small percentage of a corporation's stock at any one time. There-
fore, a shareholder who loses out in one insider trade may, by the laws of proba-
bility, avoid being the victim of other insider trades, provided that he has not sold
the entirety of his stake in the corporation. Over the long term, it is possible that
shareholders may be affected more or less equally. When companies use tech-
niques such as springloading and bullet-dodging, all shareholders are affected
equally.
34. See supra text accompanying note 29.
35. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89 COLUM.
L. REV. 1416,1418 (1989) ("The corporation is a complex set of explicit and implicit
contracts . . . .").
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with provisions that permit joint state and private enforcement."6 Nevertheless,
the fact that a regulatory provision can be contracted around implies that it can
be seen as less of a priority for state enforcement than one that cannot be con-
tracted around. Mandatory rules are mandatory because of their importance.
Default rules, on the other hand, permit deviation. The very fact that parties can
choose between one of two or more options shows that the default provision is
less important than an equivalent mandatory provision would be.
On the other hand, the rules governing insider trading by nonemployees-
that is, outsiders-cannot be contracted around in this way. A compensation
committee cannot grant springloaded or bullet-dodging options to nonemploy-
ees because they do not receive compensation from the corporation. With re-
spect to outsiders, therefore, the insider-trading regulations seem to be genuine
mandatory prohibitions, and not (sticky) default rules. The regulations as ap-
plied to outsiders, because they are mandatory, appear to be more important
than the default regulations applied to insiders.
It follows that the SEC should see insider trading by company insiders as
less of a priority for enforcement than insider trading by outsiders. It is worth
noting that the default rule against insider trading can be adjusted in two direc-
tions: It can be relaxed, but it can also be strengthened. A corporation is able to
ban its employees from all trading in its stock and even its competitors' stock-
regardless of whether this trading is on the basis of material, nonpublic infor-
mation-through its power to set the contractual terms of employment for its
employees. 7 Therefore, a corporation may have a panoply of contract rights on
which it can rely in addition to the rights provided under Rule lob-5. The SEC,
in contrast, can use only the federal regulations.
This is not to say that companies should permit insiders to trade on their
own stock. As a threshold matter, stock exchange regulations forbid insider
trading, and a corporation whose shareholders voted to permit insider trading
36. For example, Section 5(b) of the Securities Act of 1933 forbids sending a prospec-
tus for any security for which a registration statement has been filed, unless the
prospectus meets the requirements of Section io of the Act. 15 U.S.C.A. § 77e
(West 2012). The prohibition on sending the prospectus can be seen as the default
rule, and compliance with the requirements of Section lo can be seen as the alter-
ing rule. There is a private right of action for noncompliance with these rules un-
der Section 12 of the Securities Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 771 (2006). Judge-made securi-
ties laws also provide examples. Misstatements and omissions in prospectuses are
actionable, unless they are hedged with sufficient cautionary language. See, e.g., In
re Donald J. Trump Casino Sec. Litig., 7 F.3d 357 (3d Cir. 1993). In this example,
the prohibition against misstatements and omissions can be seen as a default rule,
and the inclusion of cautionary language can be seen as an altering rule. Once
again, private remedies are available in this situation. Id. at 365-66.
37. See supra note 2. For a discussion of how an insider might reproduce the effects of
insider trading by trading in a competitor company's stock, see Ian Ayres & Jo-
seph Bankman, Substitutes for Insider Trading, 54 STAN. L. REV. 235 (2001).
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would risk being delisted." More importantly, shareholders might have little
interest in permitting insider trading in their corporation's stock. 9 But the
foregoing argument does suggest that the SEC should prioritize its enforcement
actions in favor of enforcing the rules on outsider trading, not insider trading.
Nor does this argument imply that the SEC should completely disavow en-
forcement of insider-trading regulations against employees and directors. The
SEC has a huge institutional advantage over private plaintiffs in terms of the ex-
pertise it brings to the investigation of insider-trading scandals, and this ad-
vantage carries over into insider-trading enforcement actions as well.40 Moreo-
ver, much of the process of detecting insider trading is automatic: Stock
exchanges, which are regulated by the SEC, have automated systems for moni-
toring unusual trading patterns.4 ' This indicates that the SEC should continue
to lead the process of detecting violations of the insider-trading laws. But there
are different ways in which the SEC may choose to discharge its enforcement
authority. As some scholars have observed, the SEC could lead an insid-
er-trading investigation and then hand over the evidence to the affected corpo-
ration to "prosecute" the matter itself.42 In other words, if the SEC were to pri-
38. See WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 13, at 613-14. Although national stock ex-
changes also play a role in enforcing compliance with insider-trading rules, a
change in enforcement strategy by the SEC would still have real effects. First, the
SEC has broad powers over the formal enforcement actions that stock exchanges
take. 25 MARC I. STEINBERG & RALPH C. FERRARA, SECURITIES PRACTICE: FEDER-
AL AND STATE ENFORCEMENT § 14:3 (2011). Second, the SEC can also influence the
informal enforcement practices of the stock exchanges. Id. § 14:6. Third, it is argu-
able that stock exchanges derive much of their motivation to enforce rules from
the SEC-and that when the SEC is unwilling to take action itself, the stock ex-
changes will not take action. This is partially due to the fact that stock exchanges
do not have "ideal incentives" to enforce insider-trading laws. Robert Prentice,
Whither Securities Regulation? Some Behavioral Observations Regarding Proposals
for Its Future, 51 DUKE L.J. 1397, 1440-41 (2002) (quoting John C. Coffee, Jr., Pri-
vatization and Corporate Governance: The Lessons from Securities Market Failure,
25 J. CORP. L. 1, 32 (1999)). Therefore, the shared role of the SEC and the stock ex-
changes in enforcing insider-trading rules does not prevent the SEC from taking
effective action on its own.
39. Permitting insider trading might deter investment and trading in the stock, as
shareholders would suspect that their counterparties had superior information
that would give them a bad bargain. Insider trading also risks causing agency
problems that would affect the firm's performance. Robert J. Haft, The Effect of
Insider Trading Rules on the Internal Efficiency of the Large Corporation, 80 MICH.
L. REV. 1051 (1982).
40. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Incorporating State Law Fiduciary Duties into the Federal
Insider Trading Prohibition, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1189,1263,1265 (1995).
41. Id. at 1263.
42. See JONATHAN R. MACEY, INSIDER TRADING: ECONOMICS, POLITICS, AND POLICY
40-41 (1991); Douglas M. Branson, Discourse on the Supreme Court Approach to
SEC Rule iob-5 and Insider Trading, 3o EMORY L.J. 263, 302 (1981).
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oritize outsider-trading enforcement, it could turn over evidence of insider
trading to a corporation for a private enforcement action.
This suggestion would be difficult to carry out without changes to the regu-
latory regime. Even if the SEC were to exercise its discretion and choose to re-
duce enforcement actions against certain kinds of insider trading, stock ex-
changes must still enforce compliance with insider-trading rules. Without the
necessary regulatory changes, a stock exchange could not simply choose to ig-
nore a certain type of insider trading. But even without regulatory changes, the
SEC can focus on insider trading that is more likely to be the work of outsiders
or can seek harsher penalties in cases involving such trading. The SEC can
thereby use its discretion over enforcing insider-trading regulations to shift pol-
icy in the way that this Comment suggests.
CONCLUSION
This Comment has argued that federal insider-trading regulation should be
seen as a default rule, not a mandatory rule, when applied to persons who are
trading on inside information in their own company's stock. The methods by
which corporations can imitate the effects of insider trading-that is, giving di-
rectors and employees springloaded or bullet-dodging options-do not perfect-
ly correspond to insider trading as it is practiced. But they do demonstrate that
the employees of a corporation can be authorized to act in ways that, but for the
consent of the shareholders, would be a violation of fiduciary duty and would
be illegal. The SEC should recognize that the prohibition against insider trading
as applied to the employees and directors of a company can be seen as a default
rule and should adjust its enforcement accordingly.
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